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Abstract 
This paper explains how strategic planning is able to deliver strategic integration within 
organizations. While communication and participation within planning processes are 
perceived to have an integrative effect, we argue that these effects are unlikely to arise simply 
from bringing people together. Rather, we suggest that, given the varying interests of actors in 
different business units, integration will only arise from active negotiations and compromises 
between these actors. The paper is based upon a case of strategic planning in a multinational 
that was attempting to develop greater strategic integration across Europe. Drawing upon an 
activity theory framework,  we examine how a common strategy emerges over time through 
modifications to the planning process and to different actors roles within it. The findings are 
used to develop a process model that shows how different business unit characteristics of 
planning experience and relative power shape different experiences of communication and 
participation activities and different processes for achieving integration. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of how this process model contributes to the literature on strategic planning, 
political processes of strategy-making, and strategy-as-practice.  
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The Practice and Process of Delivering Integration through Strategic Planning 
While some authors have described strategic planning as a annual ritual that delivers 
little in the way of strategic thinking or genuine change (Mintzberg, 1994), others find that 
strategic planning remains a widely used organizational practice (Rigby, 2003; Whittington & 
Cauillet, 2008).  Furthermore, organizations are placing increased emphasis on planning as a 
means of enabling communication, participation and integration around common goals 
(Andersen, 2004; Grant, 2003; Ketokivi & Castaner, 2004).  Yet empirical evidence for these 
espoused integration benefits remains mixed (Wooldridge, Schmidt & Floyd, 2008), with 
many issues raised about the political nature of planning processes and the way that different 
interests are accommodated. Given that strategy making is inherently political (Guth & 
MacMillan, 1986; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982), the process by which strategic planning 
delivers strategic integration between actors in business divisions with different interests 
remains unclear. This paper thus sets out to investigate those activities that enable 
participation and communication between actors with different interests, in order to generate 
the expected benefits of increased commitment to common strategic goals. 
Our starting point is that communication and participation are unlikely to result just 
from “bringing people together”. Different interests and different experiences of 
communicative and participative activities by actors occupying different organizational roles 
are likely to impede the process, leading to only partial integration, or ‘lip service’ to 
supposedly shared goals. We therefore need to explore how issues of power, interests and 
perceptions of integration arise and are resolved through the negotiations and compromises 
that occur as actors interact over the plan. An activity theory framework is adopted in order to 
study these negotiations and compromises from the perspective of multiple participants. We 
argue that activity theory is particularly well suited to the exploration of how strategic 
planning delivers communication, participation and integration because it encourages us to 
consider the reciprocal processes through which different actors’ perspectives and the 
planning mechanism itself are modified over time in order to enable common activity to 
emerge (Jarzabkowski, 2005). This view of strategic planning is consistent with the strategy 
as practice perspective which argues for a focus on strategy making as it occurs through the 
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actions, interactions and negotiations of multiple actors (Jarzabkowski, Balogun& Seidl, 
2007; Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003; Johnson, Langley, Melin & Whittington, 2007; 
Whittington 2006).  
Empirically we draw on a longitudinal, real-time case study of a multinational 
attempting to deliver greater strategic integration across Europe through the implementation 
of a new strategic planning system.  Multinationals offer a relevant site for the exploration of 
how integration is or is not achieved in practice across diverse business units, particularly at 
times of change from a local to a more global approach, as this will require negotiation 
between previously differentiated and autonomous units (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998). Our 
findings are used to develop a process model that shows how differences between business 
units, such as planning experience and relative power, create different experiences of 
inclusion or exclusion and dominant or subordinate roles (Westley, 1990) in strategy making 
and therefore different responses to communication and participation activities within the 
planning process.  More powerful units experience the process as dominant and exclusive and 
therefore resist and seek to modify the planning process to reduce its subordinating effects 
whereas less powerful units actually feel more included and accept their subordinate role. The 
key contribution of this model is that it accounts for how strategic integration, when it is 
achieved, emerges out of strategic planning processes through an evolving and reciprocal 
relationship between the subject positions of different participants and their negotiated 
modifications to the planning process.  This model shows that planning processes should not 
be reified in the way they often are as imposed actions that actors resist or comply with, but 
rather how different participants (and their subject positions), strategic plans and strategic 
outcomes both shape and are shaped by each other through activities of resistance and 
compliance. This process model enables us to extend current literature on the political nature 
of strategic planning and strategy making in general by demonstrating the nuanced and 
varying nature of communication and participation activities.  
This paper starts with a review of the literature on strategic planning, strategy making 
and political activity, using this to build the case for the use of an activity theory framework. 
It then describes the empirical setting and methods, before presenting the findings.  These 
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findings are used to develop the process model which captures the different paths through 
which participation and communication activities can enable strategic integration between 
diverse business units within strategic planning mechanisms. Finally the paper considers the 
contributions of the findings and the implications for practice. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Various claims have been made about the efficacy of strategic planning. While 
planning was a staple in earlier strategy studies (e.g. Ackoff, 1970; Lorange, 1975), it has 
been subjected to considerable critique. For example, Mintzberg (1994) claimed that strategic 
planning had failed wherever it had been implemented, whereas Miller and Cardinal (1994) 
found that strategic planning did add value by focussing on the link between strategic 
planning and firm performance. Such critique is reflected in a steady decrease in publications 
on strategic planning since 1994 (Whittington and Cailluet 2008). However, an annual survey 
by Bain and Company indicates that strategic planning remains one of the most popular 
techniques used in leading companies worldwide (Rigby, 2003). Recent research also 
suggests that the communication and coordination function of strategic planning is of key 
importance to firms. For example, Grant (2003) shows that oil majors value the 
communicative functions of strategic planning, while Ketokivi and Castaner’s (2004) survey 
highlights strategic planning as a key integrative device enabling diverse organizational 
divisions to embrace common organizational goals. Others argue that it is precisely this 
communicative property that makes strategic planning so valuable to firms in a modern 
environment, where they are increasingly required to cope with uncertainties and to 
coordinate goals across multiple functional, product and geographical divisions (Andersen, 
2000; Brews and Hunt, 1999; Liedtka, 2000; Wilson, 1994). 
Consistent with the emphasis on its integrative potential, we follow Andersen’s (2004) 
definition of strategic planning processes “as organizational activities that systematically 
discuss mission and goals, explore the competitive environment, analyse strategic 
alternatives, and coordinate actions of implementation across the entire organization” 
(Andersen, 2004: 1275). Two features of planning, participation and communication, increase 
its viability as an integrative mechanism. First, participation in strategic planning (Lines, 
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2004; Mintzberg, 1994) has informational, affective and motivational effects on different 
groups’ commitment to a common goal. Second, communication of planning goals 
(Mintzberg, 1994) reduces goal ambiguity because employees know what the organization is 
trying to achieve. Building upon these two integrative effects of the planning process, 
Ketokivi and Castaner (2004) find a complementary association between communication and 
participation that enhances integration effects when both are used. 
These findings on the integrative role of strategic planning raise many questions about 
the social dynamics involved in integration. While communication and participation may help 
to achieve organizational integration around common goals (e.g. Andersen, 2004; Ketokivi 
and Castaner, 2004; Mintzberg, 1994; Vancil and Lorange, 1975; Wooldridge and Floyd, 
1989), it is not clear how groups with different interests develop shared understanding or at 
least common pursuit of the same strategic goals. Implicitly, the findings suggest that 
communication and participation have integrative effects by “bringing people together”. 
However, empirical evidence on the integrative effects of strategic planning is mixed (e.g. 
Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989; 1990). In particular, even when people interact directly in the 
planning process, some interests are suppressed and others promoted in ways that affect 
commitment to strategic goals (e.g. Hardy et al, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2008; Narayanan and 
Fahey, 1992; Westley, 1990). Thus, findings on the integrative effects of strategic planning 
need to be elaborated through fine-grained studies of the compromises, interactions and 
negotiations that take place over the planning process. These social and political interactions 
over strategy making are at the heart of the strategy-as-practice perspective, which calls for 
studies that illuminate the micro-activities involved in the social accomplishment of strategy 
(Jarzabkowski 2005, Jarzabkowski et al. 2007; Johnson et al. 2003, 2007; Whittington 2006). 
There is, however, little research into how the integrative effects of planning are constructed 
in practice, through the actions and interactions of multiple actors with different interests. Our 
paper responds to this gap in the literature. We first examine issues of communication, 
participation and politics in strategic planning, then propose an activity theory framework as 
way of understanding how planning processes can be used to develop integration.  
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Strategic planning is perceived as important for communicating an organization’s 
strategy internally and externally (Bartkus et al. 2000; Beer and Eisenstat 2000; Kotter 1995; 
Mintzberg 1994). While most of these authors have assumed that communication occurs after 
a plan has been formulated, others indicate that communication is important during formation 
in order that different organizational actors can have input into the plan (e.g. Grant 2003; 
Ketokivi and Castañer 2004; Lines 2004). However, the communicative purpose of planning, 
the activities that are involved in communication, and its impact on either organizational 
members or on the planning process itself are still under-researched. Organizational goals are 
seldom unitary, as they may originate with one group of actors, top managers (Simon, 1964), 
but then be significantly modified, or indeed new goals may be motivated, by middle 
managers (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman & Grove, 1996; Floyd and Lane, 
2000). In particular, goals are not stable but rather emerge and are modified through the 
communication process (Hardy et al, 2000). Hence, it is important to study how goals that are 
communicated through strategic planning are modified and adapted over the course of the 
planning process, in order to become goals to which all members can subscribe.  
Many studies of strategic planning as an integrative device largely view participation 
as a socialization mechanism that generates shared meanings (Lines, 2004). However, 
nuanced studies of participation indicate that identification with common goals varies 
according to the nature of the participation activities and the social positions of different 
actors (e.g. Korsgaard et al, 1995; Mantere and Vaara, 2008; Sagie and Koslowski, 2000; 
Schaffer and Willauer, 2003). For example, the extent of socialization may vary according to 
the gap between participants’ desired and perceived levels of participation (Driscoll, 1978). 
The association between participation and common goals is complex, as individuals 
participate in multiple communities, through which they construct a range of interests and 
identities that may not align with organizational goals (Handley et al, 2006). Thus, subjects 
may experience participation in different ways, from a threat to their own autonomy, to a 
political or social opportunity, according to the different roles that they construct for 
themselves within the organization (Musson & Duberley, 2007). These roles may also shape 
the way that actors participate. For example, Mantere and Vaara (2008) find that actors at 
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different organizational levels, such as top versus middle managers, may construct different 
ways of participating in strategy processes. These varying nuances in participation activities, 
the way that they are experienced by different actors, and the way that different actors attempt 
to engage in them, indicate that the way in which participation enhances the integrative effects 
of strategic planning is complex and bears further investigation.   
The wider literature on strategy and, particularly decision processes provides insights 
into the political issues that might obscure some of the participation and communication 
effects on strategic planning. Strategy making is an inherently political process (Chakravarthy 
& White, 2002; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982), which is 
sometimes overlooked in the literature specifically on planning.  Strategy making involves 
self-interested parties with different perceptions of what constitutes an appropriate 
organizational goal (Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). The negotiation of self-interest is 
particularly likely to play out in the interactions between different organizational roles, in 
which top managers attempt to establish strategy and middle managers either seek to 
influence the strategy according to their own interests, or to resist its implementation where it 
does not meet these interests (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997; Narayanan and Fahey, 1982).  Lower level managers gain influence 
through various forms of coalition formation that enable them to have greater influence on the 
strategy process, despite their apparent lack of hierarchical power (e.g. Balogun et al, 2005; 
Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; Westley, 1990). There is a focus in these studies on resistance to 
and influence upon the strategy process arising from actors in different hierarchical positions 
in the organization (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Mantere, 2008; Mantere & Vaara, 2008). 
Indeed, Quinn (1980) proposed that in order to overcome political and emotional resistances, 
strategy-making should proceed incrementally, learning from and adjusting the strategy 
according to the feedback received over time. Hence planning mechanisms do not necessarily 
enable strategic decisions to be implemented but rather serve as mechanisms through which 
managers at different levels are able to influence strategic action (e.g. Bower, 1970; 
Burgelman, 1983; Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Chakravarthy & White, 2001; Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Jarzabkowski, 2008). In particular, iterations over a planning process enable different 
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actors to negotiate their own interests (Chakravarthy & Lorange, 1991; Dutton & Duncan, 
1987; Johnson, 1988; Quinn, 1980) 
Different interests, particularly between middle managers and top managers, have 
received growing attention. These differences are an inevitable part of the strategic decision 
process that can either give rise to conflict and obscure strategy implementation (e.g. Guth & 
Macmillan, 1986), or alternatively be productive, giving impetus to strategic renewal (Bower, 
1970; Burgelman 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 1996; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Rouleau, 2005).  
Middle managers are important not only for implementing strategies but also for facilitating 
strategic change and giving impetus to or championing new strategies to top managers. Thus, 
the way the inevitable conflict is managed is important. For example, increasing middle 
manager integration into the strategy process has been associated with increased firm 
performance (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). That is, reducing conflict may increase consensus, 
smooth implementation and so, enhance firm performance (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). 
However, performance enhancement also occurs from participation in strategy-making 
activities, even when consensus between different organizational levels is not an outcome 
(Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). There is thus something powerful about participation in the 
strategic planning process that has positive effects, even where consensus is not an outcome. 
The different interests of those occupying different roles within the strategy process may be 
managed through reciprocal interaction, vertically and laterally (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; 
Mantere, 2008), adaptive control systems (Floyd and Lane 2000; Marginson 2002) and flatter 
organizational structures that enable increased communication (Wooldridge et al, 2008). 
However, there has been little fine-grained empirical research into the dynamics through 
which different level actors are involved in strategy making (Wooldridge et al, 2008: 1209) or 
how intra-organizational relationships are realised within strategy making (ibid: 1213). 
The way that political processes play out will also be influenced by the way in which 
the organization values input from different actors in the strategy process (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987; Westley, 1990). Actors assume or are allocated different political roles in the strategy 
process (Narayan and Fahey, 1982). However, we know little about how such roles are 
assumed or allocated, or their implications for the outcomes of the planning process in terms 
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of consensus or shared goals. It is not simply the fact of inclusion in a strategic conversation 
that enables managers at different levels to feel committed to a strategic goal (Westley, 1990). 
Even when they are included in a strategic conversation, lower level managers may be 
allocated a subordinate role, in which the scope of views that they may express and the 
emotions that they may feel about the strategy are demarcated by senior managers. Such 
findings indicate that we need to pay greater attention to how different level actors perceive 
their inclusion and ability to influence those strategic planning activities in which they 
participate if we are to account for their varying experiences of integration.  
Taken together, the above literature indicates that strategic planning is important 
within organizations because it has an integrative effect. Furthermore, this integration arises 
from the communicative and participative properties of strategic planning. However, 
communication, participation and the subsequent integration that is to arise from planning is 
likely to be fraught with difficulties arising from different interests and experiences of 
communication and participation activities by actors occupying different organizational roles. 
We therefore need to develop more nuanced understandings of strategic planning as it occurs 
in practice, in order to understand how issues of power, interests and perceptions of 
integration arise and are resolved through the negotiations and compromises that occur as 
actors interact over the plan. In particular, we need to understand how these interactions 
enable the planning process and the goals and interests of different actors to be modified to 
the extent that common organizational goals may be pursued. In doing so, we respond to calls 
for future research “to examine these dynamics and to extend the work of Ketokivi and 
Castañer (2004) in describing conditions that help to align individual and subunit interests 
with those of the larger organization” (Wooldridge et al, 2008: 1216).  
Activity theory lens 
We now propose an activity theory framework for examining the strategic planning 
process over time. Activity theory is a useful conceptual apparatus because it suggests that 
planning will be experienced differently by different actors according to their different 
interests and that the planning process itself plays an important role in these experiences. 
While the planning process is put in place to mediate between different interests, actors also 
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seek to modify the planning process according to their own interests, using it to dominate 
other actors or to advance their own interests. Activity theory is a useful framework for 
analysing these reciprocal strategy processes because it is fundamentally concerned with 
understanding dynamic processes over time; “Let us take the metaphor that strategy process 
is like a river. … This metaphor helps to understand why dynamic aspects of a larger active 
process cannot be fully explored with static samples from that process. Process, contexts and 
outcomes all change with time” (Chakravarthy and White, 2001: 200-201). While process, 
context and outcomes continuously evolve in interaction with each other, we have few 
strategy studies that explicitly adopt an ontological framework that allows them to explore 
this reciprocal process. However, this reciprocity is at the heart of practice-based studies (see, 
for example, Orlikowski, 1996; 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2008). By adopting an activity 
framework, we take a practice-based ontology, as espoused by multiple authors 
(Jarzabkowski 2004; Johnson et al, 2003; 2007; Whittington, 2006), in order to analyse 
strategy as a continuously unfolding stream of activity that is constructed through the 
interactions and negotiations between different actors. 
Activity theory (Leontiev, 1978; Vygotsky, 1978) is increasingly being drawn upon to 
look at problems of coordination and shared activity in organizations (e.g. Adler, 2005; 
Blackler, 1993; 1995; Blackler and  McDonald, 2000; Blackler et al, 2000; Foot 2002; 
Jarzabkowski, 2003; 2005; Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005; Spender, 1995). In these studies, 
the organization is conceptualized as an activity system, accomplishing common activity 
through the interactions within the system. Three concepts in activity theory are useful for 
looking at our problem of strategic planning as an integrative mechanism; goal-directed 
activity; subject; and mediation. Activity theory focuses upon practical activity as the goal-
directed interactions through which actors engage with their contexts over time. Practical 
activity provides a focus for interactions; different actors interact in order to do something. 
These actors each have their own concept of the purpose of the activity, based on their 
localized understandings about ‘the way we do things here’ (Spender, 1995), that will need to 
be modified in order to establish common activity for the system as a whole. If an 
organization is to achieve common strategic actions, these will comprise partly corporate-
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communicated intentions about what the organization should do and partly emergent  features 
of localized divisions’ own activities and interests (Blackler et al, 2000: 284). The focus or 
‘goal-directedness’ of activity is thus evolving, emerging out of the interactions and contests 
between actors, and this is a key feature of activity theory analysis; examining how a 
collective output is accomplished through interactions and contests between actors, which 
modify both the goal and how the actors engage in actions directed at the goal (Engestrom et 
al, 1999; Foot, 2002).  
In activity theory, actors are conceptualized as subjects who interact purposefully with 
their contexts; “People act as subjects in the world, constructing and instantiating their 
intentions and desires” (Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006: 10). It is through this subject’s intentions 
and actions that activity may be understood. Such activity is always collective, in so much as, 
even in acting alone, an actor relates to the collective and draws upon the tools and symbols 
of that collective. While individuals act by drawing upon and contributing to collective tools 
and symbols, they are not simply pawns of the collective. Rather, they have motives and 
desires that they impute to their own actions within wider collective activity. This concept of 
subjects as purposeful actors is important for studying the problem of strategic planning as an 
integrative mechanism. It indicates a focus on the purposes that different actors attribute to 
their own actions within the planning process and its resultant outcomes. In particular, this 
framing invites us to compare different subjects and understand interactions from different 
subject positions. We thus have a richer view of the communication and participation 
activities through which strategic planning generates integration. From an activity theory 
perspective, we cannot look at strategic planning as a set of common organizational goals that 
must be communicated to other actors, in order that they might adopt those goals, but rather 
as a study of how different actors interact with the goals that are presented and what 
modifications are necessary to accomplish those goals as common activity. 
Mediation is the third activity theory concept drawn upon in this paper; “Activity 
theory casts the relationship between people and tools as one of mediation; tools mediate 
between people and the world” (Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006: 10). Mediating tools or 
mechanisms can take social, physical and cognitive forms, such as operating procedures, 
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heuristics, scripts, routines and languages (Omicini and Ossowski, 2004). Mediation suggests 
that, despite their potentially different perspectives and interests, actors are able to integrate 
their actions in the pursuit of shared activity (Engestrom, 1993; Kozulin, 1990). However, 
activity theory does not conceptualise mediation mechanisms as primarily the instruments of 
any particular constituent, such as senior managers (Jarzabkowski, 2009). Rather, the same 
mechanisms may be appropriated by different constituents in order to mediate between their 
varied purposes and interests (Rabardel and Beguin, 2005). From this perspective, strategic 
planning is a mediating mechanism that cannot simply be imposed but must be brought into 
being by the actors who participate in it, during which process it will be modified. This is 
because strategic planning has a ‘general’ or cross-contextual character when it is introduced, 
which will come into tension with the local situated actions of different subjects (Miettinen 
and Virkkunen, 2005: 444). Thus, different subjects continuously interact with the planning 
mechanism, modifying it to suit their own interests, even as these interests are modified by 
the planning process. Such modifications involve ongoing and unfolding power dynamics 
(Blackler & McDonald, 2000), as new ways of relating and new activities emerge around 
reactions to and modifications of the planning process. Mediation is therefore a valuable 
concept for examining the integrative role of planning processes in organizations (Blackler 
1993; 1995; et al, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2003; 2005; Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005). It goes 
beyond simply explaining how common strategic actions are integrated through planning, 
possibly with some resistance, to examining how common strategic actions, different actors’ 
interests in those actions and the planning processes that mediate between them evolve 
together.  
However, we have few studies that examine these reciprocally evolving processes 
within strategic planning (Chakravarthy & White, 2001). Rather, planning processes are 
reified as ‘things’ which actors resist or acquiesce, with little understanding of how the 
process is itself accomplished through resistance and acquiescence, and how that process also 
shapes the participants and the activity in which they engage. An activity theory perspective 
is, therefore, adopted in this paper in order to explore the reciprocal relationship between the 
planning process, actor’s subject positions and the emergence of common strategic activity. 
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The paper seeks to explain the process by which strategic integration is ultimately delivered, 
identifying the specific types of modifications that need to take place in the planning process, 
the actors involved in that process, and the way that a common strategy emerges. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
As typical in longitudinal case-based research, we used theoretical sampling to select a 
case that reflected the phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990). 
Access was granted to the European Division of Brandco, a large producer of branded 
consumer goods, that reflected the traditional multinational with a country centric way of 
working (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998).  We were able to track longitudinally the evolution of a 
new annual strategic planning process established in 2004 to achieve greater strategic 
integration across Europe.  Multinational firms that are using strategic planning in an attempt 
to deliver globally integrated strategies are an appropriate site in which to examine the 
integrative effects of strategic planning (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998; Ketokivi and 
Castaner, 2004).  We chose to focus on one in-depth qualitative case study to enable us to 
capture a multi-level perspective and be closer to the actions and interpretations of the 
participants involved consistent with a strategy as practice perspective (Balogun, Huff & 
Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al, 2007).  Whilst single site case studies have their limitations, 
topical contexts, such as here building strategic integration across Europe, give findings 
broader relevance (Balogun & Johnson, 2004).   
The new planning process was facilitated by the creation of new European Marketing 
Teams (EMT).  Consistent with our research problem, the new EMTs were intended to create 
integration while allowing for locally tailored delivery.  Specifically, the EMTs were to 
develop new pan-European strategies and campaigns by working collaboratively with the 
country-based brand teams, who were then to implement these strategies locally. We focus on 
the EMT and associated planning processes for Brand X.  The Brand X EMT was located in 
the UK and sponsored by the UK Country President but it was to work in a pan-European 
fashion.  The new strategy was to be implemented through a new annual planning process, 
which comprised a series of activities occurring at the EMT-level, the country-based brand 
teams-level, and also at the Divisional Management Team-level and the country-based senior 
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management teams, providing a series of natural data collection points (see Table 1). 
Implementing the process was challenging, as different geographic regions had different 
levels of knowledge about the product, the market and, particularly, the planning process, 
while different hierarchical levels had diverse interests that they wished to realize through the 
new planning process. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We took a longitudinal, qualitative, case-based approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 
1990).  In order to track over time developing reciprocal relationships between the planning 
process, the different actors’ subject positions and the emergence of common strategic 
activity, we tracked the planning process from the perspective of the key actors: the Brand X 
EMT and the European brand X teams, including the European Brand Network (EBN) 
members of the key geographic regions. As the second author had long research engagement 
with the company, we quickly were able to identify and access the key players, as well as 
having considerable contextual understanding of the case study.  Specifically, we collected 
data from most of the main regions into which Brandco divided its European market; the UK, 
Germany, France, Spain, Nordic and Central Europe. Additionally, as the EMT was based in 
the UK and sponsored by the UK Country President, we interviewed UK senior managers 
involved in the change. Data were collected primarily through 30 interviews conducted from 
March 2004 to January 2005, with dates coinciding to key events in Table 1. Each interview 
lasted about an hour and all were audio-recorded and transcribed. We also collected copies of 
the pertinent strategic planning documents and presentations, in order to analyze what the 
planning process entailed and how different groups engaged in the planning activities. To 
further triangulate, we reported our findings for the Head of the EMT, the EMT Marketing 
Director, and the UK Country President (also sponsor of the Brand X EMT) at a one and a 
half hour meeting in 2005. Detailed notes including verbatim quotes were taken during this 
meeting and subsequently typed up.  
Our interview questions focused on how the new planning process was perceived by 
the EMT and Brand X teams in the different geographic regions at different points in the 
strategic planning process; what changes in strategic activity they were experiencing; and how 
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they perceived their own position within the planning process and within common European 
strategic activity. The data collection was split between the authors, enabling each author to 
be immersed in the activities of specific hierarchical and geographic communities, whilst 
cross-checking impressions and tentative findings after each set of interviews in order to 
inform subsequent rounds of interviews. This research design enabled us to access the subject 
positions of the key hierarchically- and geographically-based participants responsible for 
managing the new integration process, conducting repeat interviews at key points in the 
process, so that we could trace how subject positions changed over time, in interaction with 
changes in the planning process and changes in perceptions about common strategic activity. 
In order to ensure trustworthiness in our qualitative data, we followed many of the criteria laid 
down by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The second author had prolonged engagement with the 
research site, not only during this research project, but through previous research projects. 
Multiple sources of data collection were used. The final report and meeting provided research 
participant feedback. Finally, the research was written up through a thick description of the 
findings to enable their transfer to other settings 
Data Analysis 
Analysis progressed over five stages. We adopted an inductive approach to the data 
(Miles & Hubermann, 1994) in order to develop emergent themes, which we followed by 
iterative references to the theoretical framework in order to interpret our findings and develop 
labels for particular themes that arose (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2006). First, each 
author constructed rich narratives of the strategic planning activities of those groups she had 
tracked (Langley, 1999). These narratives provided thick descriptions of each groups’ 
perceptions of their own and others’ activities in the new strategic planning process and how 
they acted to shape the planning process according to their own perceived subject position 
within the common European strategy.  We then read and discussed each other’s stories, with 
each author acting as an ‘outsider’ in questioning the findings and themes of the other’s story 
(Evered and Louis, 1981).  
In the second phase, based on our discussion of the stories, we identified that different 
actors could be grouped according to the way that their different subject positions evolved 
 16 
within the planning process. Specifically, drawing on political frameworks (see Narayanan 
and Fahey, 1982), we looked at the positions that particular groups either assumed in the 
planning process, meaning the way they self-identified in that position, or were allocated, 
meaning the way that they were identified by others. Our three groups were: 
– the European Marketing Team (EMT), which assumed a subject position as strategy 
formulators and allocated others a subject position as strategy implementers 
– Large European Markets, which initially assumed a subject position as strategy 
formulators, resisted the allocation of a position as strategy implementers and eventually 
assumed a position as strategy translators 
– Small European Markets, which were initially allocated a position as strategy 
implementers and came to assume that as an appropriate position.  
Third, drawing upon the concept of mediation in our activity theory framework we 
analysed these evolving subject positions in relation to the planning mechanism, examining 
how different subjects drew upon the mechanism in order to either justify the positions that 
they assumed or how they sought to modify it, in order to better meet the positions that they 
wished to assume. For example, we found that the EMT emphasized standardization of the 
planning process in order to reinforce their assumed position as strategy formulators, while 
Large Markets tried to modify the planning process in order to assert their own position as 
formulators, or to discredit it in order to resist the allocated position of strategy implementers. 
We traced the meanings that different groups attributed to the planning process in order to 
justify their own actions and how the groups negotiated and modified the process over time 
until it could deliver a common understanding of integrated European strategy.  
Fourth, we tied these analyses of subject positions and planning process modifications 
together by comparing and contrasting the different groups’ experiences of integration over 
time, particularly in terms of how they referred to communication and participation activities. 
In this analysis, the different experiences of communication and participation that we found 
could be usefully interpreted with reference to Westley’s (1990) concepts of inclusion/ 
exclusion and domination/ subordination/ codetermination within strategic conversations. 
That is, we recognized that the way that the way that groups were attempting to modify the 
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planning mechanism and their own subject positions were associated with their different 
experiences of inclusion or exclusion and domination, subordination or codetermination in 
particular communication and participation activities within the planning process.  
Fifth, we compared the different subject positions, experiences of integration and 
attempts to modify the planning process, in order to derive some understanding of the 
different way that the process unfolded over time for Large Markets and Small Markets, and 
the different way that the EMT responded to these two groups. From this analysis, we 
recognized that two main characteristics of the different groups were important in the 
different processes; the extent of a particular market’s experience of planning and the extent 
of intra-organizational power of a particular market, in terms of its market size and revenue 
with Brand X. This final analytic stage enabled us to develop a process model explanation of 
our findings, which is presented in the discussion section of the paper and constitutes our 
main contribution.  
We now present our findings over three phases, showing how each group’s subject 
position evolved in association with that group’s experiences of integration as inclusion or 
exclusion and domination, subordination or codetermination and that group’s attempts to 
modify the planning process.  
FINDINGS 
Phase 1: Phase 1 covers the period from the April strategic issue development through 
to the June key issue review meeting, each of which were parts of the new planning process 
(see Table 1). April provided an opportunity to communicate the new strategy, while in June 
different geographic markets were able to participate in the planning process by sharing their 
key issues based on the EMT’s new strategy at a review meeting. At the same time, the EMT 
had set up the European Brand Network (EBN), comprising regular meetings between the 
EMT and members of all the main local markets and regions, in order to enable ongoing 
communication of and participation in strategy across local markets. From the outset, it was 
apparent that strategic planning had been introduced into a context in which actors had 
different experience of strategic planning, different levels of Brand X penetration within their 
markets, and different times horizons for developing a Brand X portfolio within their markets. 
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There were thus different subject positions in relation to what strategic planning constituted 
and where strategy should be formulated for Brand X.  
EMT assume a position as strategy formulators. At the outset, the EMT were keen to 
embrace communication and participation as a way to ensure that strategic planning could 
deliver a common European strategy; “… I see us as the coordinators, facilitators, and the 
people who have to make the call at the end of the day, but actually there are extended 
members of the EMT within the market.  We have single, senior marketing representatives 
from each of the major countries and each of the major regions sitting on, as we call it, the 
EBN. We very closely work with them in strategy development, information gathering, 
campaign  development and roll out”.  
At the same time, however, they saw strategic planning as a useful standardization 
tool that could cause local markets to behave in similar ways;  “I want to be able to sit there 
looking at Italy, Germany, Spain, the Northern region, the Southern region, and actually be 
able to benchmark and see the consistencies and inconsistencies across Europe, so if someone 
comes in and says OK, this is what the market analysis has said they are using the same 
parameters to analyse their market as someone in Italy or Spain.  Otherwise it is incredibly 
difficult for me to sit there and say that’s a good plan, that’s not a good plan, here’s the 
challenge, and here’s the support”. This view of planning, which involved the development 
of a common set of planning templates to be used by all local markets, indicated two points. 
First, from the EMT perspective, integration was possible because local markets were 
perceived as largely undifferentiated. If markets had inconsistencies, planning provided 
comparators to benchmark and standardize outputs. Planning was thus not only about 
communicating a common strategy but also about ensuring that the EMT could evaluate 
common output across markets, leading to the second point. As local markets were 
undifferentiated, the strategizing role of actors in local markets was negated, emphasizing a 
particular subject position for EMT as strategy formulators, who adjudicated on local strategy. 
Despite their initial intentions to be strategy coordinators and facilitators, with strong 
participation from local markets, as the standardizing aspects of planning took hold, the EMT 
assumed the position of strategy formulators. They thus assumed a dominant role in 
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integration activities; “We are there to set the European strategy which includes brand 
positioning and includes the key messages and includes the campaign”.  
Small Markets are allocated a position as strategy implementers. Small markets, with 
little experience in strategic planning found the new process, with its templates and rigorous 
planning format, quite challenging; “In Finland we never kind of split the planning  process in 
two so kind of firstly the issues and kind of ok on those, and then go onto the next phase which 
is how we are going to solve these things … So people are not so used to ... They are used to 
filling in templates but they are not so used to kind of understand why they should do” (Nth 
EU). At the same time, smaller markets played a small part in the Brand X market penetration 
and revenues; “And very different market situations as well, so  in some markets the product 
was launched two years ago, and is quite successful.  In other markets the product is still not 
available” (Central EU); “if you represent one country and come back home and basically 
these guys normally also work with Brand X products … it’s their kind of their main work.  
While representing a country or area … I didn’t even know what Brand X  was when I started 
to represent Northern Europe” (Nth EU). Thus, small markets’ experiences of 
communication and participation activities were largely of a subordinate nature as they tried 
to learn about both Brand X and about more formalized ways of planning.  
While the new experiences were challenging, the small markets also began to perceive 
that this new process could support them in implementing a Brand X strategy; “it doesn’t take 
away any work load, but it actually adds things, analysis etc., you know, materials that you 
were not able to produce before” (Nth EU); “in this way when I work locally I can count on 
the support of those programmes that have been at the European level and I can profit and 
capitalise on those a lot” (SP). Small markets thus embraced opportunities to participate with 
other markets and the EMT.   
Large markets assume a position as strategy formulators in their own markets. The 
large markets were already experienced in strategic planning. They had considerable market 
share in Brand X and were important revenue streams for Brandco. When they heard about 
the EMT, the new planning templates, the common strategy and the common campaign for 
Brand X, they were relatively unconcerned, seeing this as having little influence on their 
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actions; “it is good to have a common way of us presenting the figures, that’s ok, but for the 
action plans, actions are very different from one country to another one” (FR). They expected 
that the planning process was largely to help develop the smaller, inexperienced markets; “I 
think if you are talking to some other countries my observations are that somebody can go 
through that planning process with much more, like a new thing for them and make them 
consider elements of the situation analysis that they have never considered before” (UK). 
Due to their experience in formulating strategy, they expected to have a lot of input into the 
common European strategy; “so I see it as two-way … they will have to market .. there will be 
a lot of communication between the markets and the EMT to develop strategy, and then 
actually implement it” (UK).  
As these large markets participated in strategic planning sessions with the EMT and 
other countries, their perceptions about the importance of Brand X and its different 
positioning in their markets were reinforced; “Needs are different: we were so different in our 
key issues, and the market is … was at this time totally different, the position of Germany and 
France regarding the product was totally different … we were not at the same time in the 
same situation (FR); “… the UK is a very different market.  … we are in a very different 
place” (UK); “in our case, we had a slightly different understanding of what the key issues 
are for Germany” (Germany).  They were thus convinced that they would participate in 
developing common elements of strategy, whilst maintaining their own distinctiveness as 
important, knowledgeable markets with good experience of planning for their own markets.  
As the planning process evolved and the EMT began to take a stronger view of 
planning as a standardization tool for adjudicating on what they saw as largely 
undifferentiated markets, so these larger markets developed a negative view of the 
communication and participation they were experiencing; “a classic one is this week when it 
could have been a slide show that they could have sent to everyone, because they didn’t get 
that debate.  And my brand planner said, you know, everyone was quiet listening to the 
presentation.  That to me isn’t an effective EBN and how we should be working.  I think we 
should really be challenging understanding  … the debate is where we move on and develop 
strategy.  To me it is not coming from … if they just do a load of PowerPoint presentations to 
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everybody and they take it … nobody owns that then.  It’s the EMT Marketing Director and 
his team that own it, we don’t in EBN” (UK). Hence, as they moved towards the June review 
meeting, large markets felt that, even so that they were being physically included in 
communication activities, they were being excluded from participating in formulating the 
strategy. They thus experienced their dynamic with the EMT as one of domination and 
subordination that was inappropriate to their position as strategy formulators.   
Phase 2: In Phase 2, which began with the June key issue review, and progressed to 
the development of Brand X market and campaign plans, the patterns of differentiation that 
emerged in the previous phase were accentuated, provoking resistance. At the June meetings, 
many markets, small and large were exposed to the standardization of the planning process, as 
they were pulled into line for not developing appropriate “key issues”, based on the EMT’s 
templates and definitions; “And now in June, last week, we had meetings with all the most 
important countries from the regions.  And they presented those key issues to us, we had the 
discussion” … “And then, if you agree with them the strategic direction and the key issues, 
then they go back and they write plans to address to those key issues and plans” (EMT).. 
EMT assume a stronger position as strategy formulators. The EMT ambitions for the 
June meetings indicated some contradictions in their perceptions of communication and 
participation. They felt the June reviews should generate key issues for each country 
consistent with the EMT strategy for Brand X, because they had used the EBN to 
communicate the strategy and expectations, indicating that they were already quite entrenched 
in their own subject position as strategy formulators, with planning as a mechanism for 
communicating that strategy “Actually we have taken them through each step of the start up 
document, so that actually there’s more understanding of what we are asking them to do and 
why we are asking them to do it”. At the same time, they clung to views of strategic planning 
as participative; “I’ve chosen to do that one (June) by a meeting as well, or several meetings 
so we get several countries together presenting their plans to us, so it doesn’t feel quite as 
much of us going and saying, right, present a plan, you know we are the superior bods with 
great brains, because that’s not the case at all … we are trying to add support and actually 
challenge them to get the most out of every part of the business”. 
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However, at the June meetings, the EMT actually reinforced their positions as strategy 
formulators, using the standardization of the planning mechanism to dominate other parties; 
“It all used to be about strategic options … and the key messages and the campaign, and how 
are we going to implement, as well as the tactics.  All that’s going to be gone.  They should 
just be, in these templates, sticking in what we are saying …and the key messages should be 
exactly what the EMT said they are”. 
Small markets assume a position as strategy implementers. Small markets began to 
realise that these planning templates, review meetings, EBN meetings, and the subsequent 
campaign aids being developed were to their advantage. They recognized that their 
opportunities for participation in formulating European strategy were limited and that they 
would need to conform to common activity if they wanted to gain traction with Brand X; 
“Actually in one of the sessions when all the Northern European GMs were there, I just had to 
stand up and say, guys, you are way out of line here … you need to understand what you can 
effect and what you can’t effect, and you know you should stop discussing those things where 
actually you don’t have the power to say anything about this … we are not actually changing 
the strategy, we are actually coming to really think how can we, in our country, or in our 
region, or whatever, do the best in terms of implementing things” (Nth EU). They thus 
curtailed their expectations of participation in strategy formulation, trading these off for the 
value of participating in implementation plans with more experienced European countries; 
“So to me even though it is a much more different country , the tactics on some of the issues, 
the approach to the issues is quite useful to me because I like to see what happened there so 
what can we take from that and how did they approach to this.  So in that way that interaction 
is quite good” (SP).  
These trade-offs enabled small markets to accept their subordinate role in the planning 
process and to assume the subject position of implementers of a common European strategy 
that had been allocated to them by the EMT. They thus began to experience the EBN 
meetings and interactions with the EMT as participative and were willing to subordinate their 
local differences; “And I felt really, really involved.  We all know that when you work with 
different European countries everyone has their own peculiarities, or how do you say, their 
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local things. But all the, everyone had the opportunity to provide with input and try to bring 
here the Spanish situation or what ever the situation is to be.  So in that way I think there was 
much of a consensus going on in between all the decisions” (SP).  
As small markets had gained by accepting the subject position of strategy 
implementers and the associated standardization in planning, they were amenable to adopting 
the EMT designed campaign with no amendments other than translation into their own 
language and amending plans at the September sign-off as requested, which further reinforced 
their subject position as strategy implementers; “Honestly I must say that the smaller markets 
would never have a strategy for our brands in the first place without the EMT, so really it’s 
just great that we now have one” (Nth EU); “So coming from a small market like Hungary, 
and I see the same in other markets in the region, I can see that we never did such a 
professional market research and strategy and planning procedure like in this case with 
Brand X” (Central EU). This strategy implementer position was complementary to and 
reinforced the EMT position as strategy formulators, reinforcing the dominant-subordinate 
dynamic in communication and participation activities. Thus small markets became 
increasingly integrated into a common European strategy through their acceptance of the 
standardized planning process and their role in it. 
Large Markets resist the EMT allocated position of strategy implementers. In the large 
markets, the challenges at the September meeting and over the campaign affected their 
experiences of the planning process. They realized that they were not able to use their local 
knowledge to participate in common strategy formulation. They thus began to disparage the 
planning process as largely irrelevant, rather than as opportunities to participate in strategy-
making; “What I am not seeing from the EMT is say, Germany did this, and it was fantastic.  
What a great idea.  We don’t see that, sort of, sharing of best practice.  What they seem to be 
doing is generating support for the markets that are needing to come up to a certain level, but 
actually the other markets that are already there ...  There isn’t enough to sort of push them 
on” (UK). They began to assert the importance of their local markets and adherence to their 
local procedures during the market and campaign development; “We have a German planning 
process, a German business team, all the key stakeholder functions are in this team and what 
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we actually did, we split up the work and used our core competences from different team 
members and gathered the plans in a way that we all agree on it. … So I think the direction, 
where we are going with Brand X … if there are then some specific things for the adjustment 
of the strategy to the German market, that is certainly in my understanding, the responsibility 
of the market” (DE). In this reaction to what they perceived as an overly standardized 
planning process, the large markets were rejecting the subordinate role in their interactions 
with the EMT and asserting their subject position as distinctive and powerful markets that 
should formulate their own local strategy. 
However, the EMT were increasingly convinced that local markets were largely 
undifferentiated, and so should conform to a central, EMT-formulated strategy. They used the 
planning process as a standardization mechanism to control local differentiation and reinforce 
their own dominance in strategy communications; “Yesterday one country was saying we 
want to do educational promotions, and we are developing such a programme.  And we say to 
them no you shouldn’t do that, you should stop it, we have got it in our plans.  We will deliver 
it to you, you don’t need to invest money, put that money into something else” (EMT). Thus, 
the EMT extended their own scope as strategy formulators and reduced the opportunities for 
local teams to participate in strategy formulation. Planning was extended from 
communicating a central strategy to providing many additional elements with which the local 
markets were to comply. In effect, the EMT now perceived that, in order to complement their 
own subject position as strategy formulators, the appropriate subject positions of local 
markets was to be strategy implementers; “[They] should not be planning strategy, they 
should not be developing campaigns;  their remit is very different now.   Therefore the way 
that they are going to go through the planning is more about how do I take what the EMT is 
putting out, and implement it brilliantly”. 
Large markets protested that this was outside the EMT remit. They were assuming too 
much control over local strategy; “I think they have exceeded the remit, because they have 
provided the strategy … they have provided material, they have delivered a programme of 
market shaping, and also a process in order to improve market access across Europe, and in 
my understanding this was not in their … I have been surprised that they have delivered the 
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market building and the market access campaign” (France). In response, the large markets 
disparaged the EMT market planning process as inferior to local planning processes; “they 
didn’t do a competitor review, and they didn’t do a segmentation review, and they hadn’t sort 
of; they hadn’t done all the stuff they were asking us to do and yet they’d got key issues and 
you kind of thought, why haven’t they” (UK). They also criticized the dominant-subordinate 
dynamic of the EMT in integration activities; “The marketing campaign, when we adjusted it  
for the German market, and we had to ask for approval in the EMT, and we went through 
each page and so on, this is more in a direction of centralisation” (Germany). Tension 
mounted, as large markets resisted their EMT-allocated position as strategy implementers.  
The EMT reacted by asserting their position as strategy formulators for Europe, and 
exerting dominance in their interactions with the large markets; “we are not negotiating with 
them, we are politely trying to explain to them why they should do it.  It’s a process that we 
have been tasked to do, either that or every country will go back and do their own thing just 
with a different look, which is not the point, the point is to have a consistent campaign, both 
in terms of the way it looks and its content” (EMT). While large markets insisted that the 
planning process was too standardized and needed modifying to local demands, the EMT 
prevented them from adapting the EMT-driven brand campaign. Instead of complying with 
the changes, the large markets resisted; “So if I am saying we are implementing the strategy, 
and we are using the sales aid, even if we are saying we are adapting it to the German market 
maybe slightly, this should be possible” (Germany). In particular, a confrontation arose over 
the UK market’s insistence that they needed a different campaign because that was best for 
their market revenues. The large markets were emphasizing their power as knowledgeable 
strategy formulators in local markets.  
Drawing on their successful experiences in generating common strategy with the 
smaller markets, the EMT insisted that strategic planning was about standardization, “If your 
model is doing things 90% right across the whole of Europe is better than every market trying 
to do it 100% right in their market, then your bottom line has got to be that that applies 
equally to the bigger markets as to the smaller”. They particularly wanted the defiant UK to 
comply; The challenge with the UK is for the UK to not to set a bad example if you want, 
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about exemption from the rules, so that other markets can pick it up and use it as an example 
to be inconsistent within the European strategy or the European campaign” (EMT). However, 
the UK refused to accept EMT jurisdiction, appealing to their country President, who was also 
the sponsor of the EMT, to adjudicate, on the basis that their local market expertise and their 
strong revenue, would be damaged by the common campaign; “What we want to make sure 
happens is that we have got the strongest messages that we possibly can, and that we don’t 
lose out on that”. It was made clear to the EMT that as far as large local markets were 
concerned, the new planning process risked Brandco’s profitability, with large markets 
asserting their rights to pursue local activities. 
At the end of Phase 2, the planning process had thus had only partial success in 
generating a common European strategy. Managers in small markets accepted their allocated 
subject positions as strategy implementers, subordinated themselves to the standardized 
planning process and so began to experience the integration activities as positive and 
appropriately dominant-subordinate in terms of communication and participation. However, 
actors in large markets resisted the allocated position of strategy implementers and attempted 
to modify the planning process in order to assert themselves as strategy formulators and avoid 
a subordinate role in their interactions with the EMT.  
Phase 3: From October onwards, following the resistance in Phase 2, there was much 
face-to-face discussion between the EMT, the UK president, the UK market and the other 
large markets. Eventually, assured by the UK President as the EMT sponsor, that he would 
authorize the changes that markets such as the UK wanted to make, the EMT made 
compromises, such as allowing the UK to modify their campaign; “So there was a conscious 
compromise in several areas in order to get the model working and delivering” (EMT). More 
importantly, in order to account for knowledge and expertise in local markets, the planning 
process was modified to include red, amber and green categories. These modifications 
indicated where European strategy and messages must be asserted (red), where local activities 
could take precedence (green) and amber areas that were to be negotiated around a mix of 
local and European activity, which would involve greater interaction between these large 
markets and the EMT. At the same time, the EMT was still authorized to develop a common 
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European strategy. The EMT’s right to standardize much future planning was emphasized; 
strategic activity was to be seen as 90-95% undifferentiated. 
EMT are strategy formulators who seek active participation from large markets in 
formulating local campaigns. The EMT was pleased to have their position as strategy 
formulators reinforced hierarchically; “if it’s a much better thing for 95% of the markets then 
we should do it.  People should think European and what’s best for Europe”.  At the same 
time, they had made a subtle but important modification to their understanding of common 
European strategy. They now recognized that in their efforts to achieve a common strategy 
they needed to acknowledge and allow for large market differences, where subtle 
differentiations were specifically geared to maximizing market share in those markets; “the 
variety tends to be in the more important markets” (EMT).  
As they modified their understanding of common strategy to allow for small 
variations, so the EMT also modified the planning process, not only in those areas on which 
local markets could negotiate, but also in terms of opportunities for participation for the larger 
markets. They proposed to increase participation as part of their own acceptance that they 
needed to change from a dominant-subordinate dynamic in their interactions with large 
markets to one that enhanced co-determination of the common strategy;  “Anna might take the 
lead on that, and pull a small team together from the UK, Germany and France …  They will 
do some work for a month, or 2 months, and then come back to  report back … if we just had 
us here, the group of 4 managers and myself, we were developing everything, we wouldn’t 
have this European flavour”. Common strategy had to be sure to incorporate greater 
receptiveness to strategy-making in important markets, where some differentiation might be 
linked to profitability. Thus the EMT subtly modified their subject position, remaining 
strategy formulators but with more participation in formulation from the large markets.  
Small markets embed their position as strategy implementers. Managers in the small 
markets were satisfied with the outcomes of the strategic planning process. Their own 
experience of the standardizing aspects of the planning process, with its associated subject 
position as strategy implementers, had been positive in raising their status in Brandco; “Being 
in a  smaller market so it even being the same seniority you know, puts you more in the higher 
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up of the hierarchy in a way, so from my perspective I never had -  I know what the purpose of 
this [the common strategy] was” (Nth EU). These managers had also benefited from 
participation in the planning process, giving them a positive experience of their new subject 
position; “Quite happy implementing and the overall process I am quite happy with as well, 
because I think that you were kind of saving a lot of resources, because for me locally, 
working with my local agencies that were not fully into every data.  So it was kind of, you 
know, kind of a massive effort in developing my local campaign” (SP). 
These markets thus endorsed the common strategy and, in association, the 
standardized planning process; “For me the most important thing is that you have a very well, 
a very robust plan, strategic plan, on a European basis which you kind of … know is as good 
as it can be, and I think that is the major role and then to make sure that you have a European 
strategy that you stick to, and have a European position, and European campaigns, etc.” (Nth 
EU). Based on their own experience of participating in strategy implementation, these 
markets endorsed the subject position of the EMT as strategy formulators, suggesting that 
more EMT control over local strategy would be appropriate; “We cannot make it individually 
in 40 markets in isolation.  We need a European approach, European vision.  And the EMT 
represents that… care should be taken that the EMT is not neutral or is not just coordination 
of local activities but has a very strong say” (Central EU). These small markets thus became 
embedded in their allocated position as strategy implementers and embraced their own 
subordinate position and the dominance of the EMT.  
Large markets assume a new subject position as strategy ‘translators’, aided by 
modifications to the planning process to enable greater participation. The large markets were 
aware that the planning process had changed their subject position. They were no longer 
strategy formulators but strategy translators; “It’s changed absolutely everything.  Because we 
don’t develop them anymore (the campaigns), we don’t work with ourselves for development, 
you know our big challenge now is brand translation” (UK). While the modifications to the 
planning process to include amber and green areas, on which they could negotiate, were 
important face-saving devices that enabled them to better manage their perceptions of 
subordination in interactions with the EMT, they also recognized that their subject position 
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had changed to translating a strategy formulated elsewhere; “so instead of developing our own 
campaign, we now have to translate a campaign. My brand managers were very creative in 
doing this, so its just that they are having a different completely new area to work on …  So it 
is certainly different if you are developing a campaign or just adapting one” (Germany). 
Nonetheless, large markets were pleased that they had been able to modify some 
standardization within the planning process to accommodate their own position and interests; 
“I don’t think the purpose was to standardise campaigns, that was a kind of by product I 
think.  So they weren’t going out to ….. right, we have the same amount across Europe we 
will increase our sales by x number, I don’t think that was the objective, I think the objective 
was let’s improve the quality of the campaigns across Europe on average and that will give us 
say, a percentage sales increase” (UK) 
Additionally, enhanced opportunities to participate in formulating strategy with the 
EMT, which had a more co-determining than dominant-subordinate dynamic, helped large 
markets to feel included in the planning process, whereas they had previously felt excluded, 
even when they were present in strategy communications from the EMT; “It’s not planning; 
it’s how you plan: Face-to-face meetings always have a big advantage in terms of how you 
can interact, about how you can discuss these things, that is certainly the best way to bring 
things quickly forward” (Germany).  In effect, by modifying the planning process to accord 
some differential treatment to large markets, both to negotiate some areas of their strategy, 
and also to participate more in formulating the common strategy, the large markets had 
become resigned to their new subject position. They felt that they had been able to shape the 
process, which made its implications more acceptable. As they were given jurisdiction over 
some areas of their campaigns, they compared the increased participation favourably, with 
their initial experiences of the planning process; “We have been involved more and more. 
Early on when we worked with the EMT it was very top down, but we have been more and 
more involved … so I am more comfortable when the local markets are supposed to 
implement this material as I am being involved in all the reflection and all the discussion” 
(FR); “Which is so much ….because you own it.  So we are all agreeing.  We did it with a 
slide set.  What was red, what was amber, and what was green.  And we agreed it as a team, 
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what you had to do.  What you could debate, what you could change.  … But we didn’t have 
that in June and that was the biggest difficulty why the campaign was harder to roll out.  Why 
we kept going back and challenging things” (UK). 
Increased codetermination of the strategy, combined with subtle modifications to the 
planning process, enabled greater acceptance of common strategy; “The key thing is that you 
find a consolidated view on something and then you put all the effort behind it from the 
European perspective and from the local perspective to bring things forward.  So it is fair to 
say that you argue about things during the process, but if the decision is made, then 
everybody has to pull in the same direction” (Germany). Indeed, while the planning process 
had significantly altered the subject position of large markets, the ability to negotiate along 
the way had also modified their view of that position, the common strategy and the planning 
process; “We have had a few negotiations along the way, but now we have got it we are happy 
with it.  …  To me for it to be a success is all teams working together all the time; I guess that 
communication should be ongoing” (UK). 
By the end of Phase 3, subtle differences in the planning process had emerged that 
enabled two different interdependent subject positions. The EMT had one set of 
interdependent positions with the small markets, as they were strategy formulators to those 
markets’ positions as strategy implementers. Modifications to enable these interdependent 
positions involved increased standardisation in the planning mechanism and 
dominant/subordinate planning interactions. At the same time, the EMT had different 
interdependent positions as strategy formulators, in participation with large markets, who 
were strategy translators of the commonly agreed strategy. Modifications to the planning 
process in these relationships involved greater differentiation in plans and increased 
opportunities for participation that featured codetermination planning interactions. These 
subtle differences reflected the different experience and power bases, and hence, 
interdependencies between different actors. Small markets were inexperienced in strategy 
formulation and dependent upon the EMT for resources to improve their planning, campaigns 
and Brand X profitability, while the EMT was dependent upon the large markets, with strong 
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local planning experience, to continue delivering high levels of profitability within their local 
markets, even as they engaged with a common strategy. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper set out to explore the reciprocal relationship between the planning process, 
actor’s subject positions, and the emergence of common strategic activity, in order to explain 
the process by which planning delivers strategic integration. Our findings show that specific 
modifications occurred in actors’ subject positions, participation dynamics within the 
planning process and changes to the planning mechanism over three phases. In particular, 
over the duration of the planning process, two different interdependent subject positions with 
the EMT emerged. These findings are used to develop a process model, Figure 1 that shows 
how different processes of strategic planning evolve to accommodate the interests of different 
groups of actors in delivering an integrated strategy. This conceptual model constitutes the 
core contribution of our study. We now discuss each element of this model.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 shows the variation in two contextual characteristics of business units, 
planning experience and intra-organizational power (A), that were consequential for the way 
that the planning process evolved in our study. Actors in the large European markets had 
significant experience in strategic planning, which they perceived as equal or even superior to 
the experience of the EMT, particularly in terms of local strategy. By contrast, actors in small 
markets had little planning experience. At the same time, the large European markets had high 
power within Brandco, particularly over Brand X, because they were important sources of 
revenue, whereas small markets had less power due to less revenue-generating potential in 
Brand X. These contextual characteristics had implications for the way that these different 
markets perceived their allocated position as strategy implementers at the outset of the 
planning process, and also for their experiences of integration activities.  
For the large markets, with higher planning experience and intra-organizational power 
(B1), the planning process was perceived as subverting their existing position as strategy 
formulators. At the same time, they experienced integration activities, involving participation 
in and communication of the common strategy, as not inclusive. As shown in Phase 1 &2 of 
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the findings, even when they were present in specific integration events, such as the initial 
campaign presentation in June, they experienced these as top-down communications that 
excluded them from active participation in formulating strategy. They thus felt that the EMT 
dominated integration events, relegating others to a subordinate role, which further reinforced 
their perception that their planning experience was not valued and that they were losing their 
position as strategy formulators. By contrast, small markets with little planning experience or 
intra-organizational power (B2), perceived that the planning process strengthened their 
position as strategy implementers by providing them with resources and access to the centre 
that they would otherwise not have. They therefore experienced integration activities as 
positive. Even when they realised that they were not participating in strategy formulation, but 
rather being communicated to about strategy implementation, they accepted that this 
subordinate role was appropriate to their experience and power and thus felt that the 
integration activities were inclusive. These different experiences had implications for the way 
that the planning process evolved for the two groups. 
As explained in Phase 2 of the findings, the negative experiences of the large markets 
meant that they resisted their EMT-allocated position as strategy implementers, leading to 
Process 1 (C1) in our model. Process 1 captures the findings from Phase 3, by explaining how 
the planning mechanism was modified in order to accommodate local planning experience 
and planning differences in local markets. Modifications also involved changes in 
participation activities, in order to increase inclusion and modify the dynamic from one of a 
dominant EMT communicating strategy to a subordinate local market. Rather, greater 
participation in formulating strategy for the European market as a whole and for large local 
markets in particular, introduced a codetermination dynamic that enabled actors in those 
markets to feel included in formulating strategy. Despite increased inclusion, it is important to 
recognize that the political struggles that took place over these modifications to the planning 
process also involved modifications to the subject position of large markets. Increased 
participation and greater discretion over local market planning increased their perceptions of 
inclusion and codetermination but also enabled them to become resigned to their own 
changing position. Thus, they began to refer to themselves as strategy translators (D1), which 
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was a less subordinate position than simply being an implementer of a strategy formulated 
elsewhere. By assuming a position as strategy translators, large markets were able to develop 
interdependent subject positions with the EMT as strategy formulators.  
By contrast, as illustrated in Phase 2 of the findings, small markets’ acceptance of a 
subordinate role and their experiences of the planning process as inclusive meant that they 
acquiesced with their EMT-allocated position as strategy implementers, leading to Process 2 
(C2) in our model. Process 2 shows how the strategic planning process was embedded within 
these markets through greater standardization of the planning metrics and templates, in order 
to ensure that a similar strategy was followed in all markets. Importantly, as shown in Phase 3 
of the findings, in normalizing the standardized planning process, the small markets further 
embedded their own position as strategy implementers (D2) and endorsed the dominant-
subordinate dynamics of the integration activities. Indeed, they called for great EMT control 
to ensure similar strategic planning and common activity across all markets. Thus, the small 
markets actively assumed an interdependent position of strategy implementers with the EMT 
as strategy formulators. 
This explanation of our process model, Figure 1, explains how, in shaping the 
planning process the subject positions of the key actors were also shaped, until a position of 
common strategy could be reached.  This process model thus answers our research question 
by showing the specific processes through which a planning process aimed at strategic 
integration and the actors engaged in that process shape each other, until a situation emerges 
in which different actors are able to pursue largely common strategy. Furthermore, the model 
explains variations in this process according to different business unit characteristics and, 
hence, different experiences of integration activities, leading to different processes and subject 
positions, even within a single case organization.   
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Figure 1 presents an empirically-grounded process model of our findings. This model 
contributes to the literature on the integrative effects of strategic planning, politics and 
participation in the strategy-making process, activity theory and the strategy-as-practice 
perspective. First, our study makes a contribution to the literature on the integrative effects of 
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strategic planning. Strategic planning has been found to have integrative effects, uniting 
diverse units under common strategic goals through the activities of participation and 
communication (Andersen, 2004; Ketokivi and Castaner, 2004: Lines, 2004). However, as 
discussed in the theoretical framework, while we know that strategic planning has integrative 
effects, less is known about how such integration occurs, particularly given the different 
interests and roles that different actors bring to the strategy process (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004; Burgelman, 1983; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Mantere & Vaara, 2008). At least part of this 
problem is that much of the research in this area has been cross-sectional and survey-based, so 
that it is unclear how communication and participation enables integration, leading 
Wooldridge et al (2008) to call for fine-grained studies of strategic planning dynamics that 
extend existing studies by explaining those conditions under which sub-unit interests would 
be aligned with those of the wider organization.  
Our process model has addressed this concern by showing those business unit 
characteristics of planning experience and relative power under which sub-units experience 
and respond differently to the integrative effects of strategic planning. Furthermore, by 
drawing on the literature on politics and power in strategy-making, we have been able to 
elaborate existing findings on participation and communication in the planning process. Using 
Westley’s (1990) concepts of inclusion and exclusion, and dominant, subordinate or co-
determinant interactions within strategic conversations, we show the specific ways that 
business unit characteristics of planning experience and intra-organizational power, affect 
different units’ experiences of participation and communication. Actors in more powerful and 
experienced units experience the same participation and communication activities as 
dominant and exclusive, while actors in less powerful and experienced units experience  those 
activities as inclusive and accept their subordinate role. Hence, integration activities need to 
vary, in order to provide higher levels of participation and enable codetermination of strategic 
goals for those units with higher planning experience and power. Strategic planning thus must 
be varied in the way that it is rolled out across different business units, in order to have 
integrative effects on the organization as a whole. 
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In making this contribution to the planning literature, we also extend Westley’s (1990) 
concepts, which were grounded in vignettes of individual conversations with middle 
managers but had not been extended to a longitudinal study. Our study explains how 
interaction dynamics change over a series of strategic conversations, such as those which 
occur in a planning process. First, we show, empirically, that even where managers are 
physically present or included in a strategic conversation, they may feel excluded if the 
interaction dynamic is dominated by one party, in our case the EMT, allocating a subordinate 
role to others in the process. Thus, exclusion from strategy conversation can occur, even when 
physical inclusion occurs. Second, we show that the extent to which a subordinate role in a 
strategic conversation lessens commitment to strategic goals is dependent upon the extent to 
which the subordinated actors accept the role allocated to them, as with our small markets. 
Thus, subordination may be a positive or negative experience according to the starting 
position of two parties in a strategic conversation. Third, our findings show how 
conversational roles and dynamics can evolve over the course of a planning process, as both 
parties, through a range of political interactions, learn how to develop interaction dynamics 
that are appropriate to their relative status. For example, conversations with large markets 
evolved into codetermination of strategy, whereas those with smaller markets remained 
dominant and subordinate. We thus suggest that there is a processual relationship in Westley’s 
(1990) concepts that might benefit from further research over a larger sample of cases. 
Our findings also extend existing research into politics and different roles and subject 
positions within the strategy process. Our study elaborates Narayanan and Fahey’s (1982) 
concepts, by showing how actors are allocated or assume different positions within the 
strategy process and the political implications of allocating particular positions.  We show 
that, where actors are allocated subordinate positions within the strategy process, particularly 
where these involve change of position, such as moving from strategy formulators to strategy 
implementers, resistance is likely to occur. The extent of resistance or acquiescence to an 
allocated strategy position depends upon those actors existing power bases. Furthermore, 
actors will need time to interact with others in order to move from a perception of imposition 
about allocated roles to one in which they have negotiated the role that they are willing to 
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assume, as found with our large markets. Thus, concepts of incrementalism (Johnson, 1988; 
Quinn, 1980) remain pertinent, not only for allowing senior managers to learn from and 
respond to political and emotional reactions to change, but also for allowing lower level 
managers to renegotiate their positions within the planning process.  
While strategy process, context and outcomes are understood to co-evolve in a 
dynamic and ongoing process (Chakravarthy & White, 2001), there are few studies that adopt 
an explicit ontological approach to the evolving interaction between these elements of 
strategy making (Jarzabkowski, 2008; Johnson et al, 2007; Orlikowski, 1996; 2000; 
Whittington, 2006). The activity theory basis of our study allowed us to explain how strategic 
integration emerges as an outcome of the strategic planning process through the evolving and 
reciprocal relationship between the subject positions of different actors and their 
modifications to the planning process. We thus provide valuable insights into the reciprocal 
processes by which actors, strategic plans and strategic outcomes shape and are shaped by 
each other. Our framework might thus prove a valuable theoretical underpinning for other 
strategy practice and process researchers. 
This study also contributes to organizational research that takes an activity theory 
perspective. Our findings provide empirical evidence of the ‘retooling’ process (Miettinen and 
Virkkunen, 2005), through which a planning mechanism, put in place to achieve strategic 
integration, was modified both in its specific mechanisms, such as the extent of standardized 
templates and campaigns, and also in the participation activities that took place within that 
process. These modifications not only accommodated different actors interests but also 
reshaped their subject positions, so that they could develop varying but sufficiently 
interdependent positions that the organization could function as an activity system pursuing a 
largely common strategy. This paper furthers activity theory by illustrating the power 
dynamics involved in retooling, which have been insufficiently examined in activity theory 
(Blackler and MacDonald, 2000), leading to some criticisms that it offers an over-socialized 
view of common activity (e.g. Handley et al, 2006: 642). Our findings show that not only is 
power implicated in how the planning mechanism is modified, as those more powerful actors 
had the capacity to engage in modifications, but also that changing power positions are 
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mediated through those modifications (Adler, 2005); large markets became reconciled to their 
new subject position as they modified the process to account for their power difference. 
Power is thus a product and a medium of the mediation process as actors interact with their 
world, which might fruitfully be further explored in activity theory. 
Finally, this paper contributes to a practice perspective on strategy as a situated, 
socially accomplished activity, constructed through the actions, interactions and negotiations 
of multiple actors (Balogun et al, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al, 2007; 
Johnson et al, 2003; 2007; Mantere, 2008; Whittington, 2006). The strategy-as-practice 
research agenda has a particular concern to explain how the social practices and activities of 
multiple actors are consequential for organizational strategy. Our practice-based activity 
framework (Jarzabkowski, 2009), shows how common strategic activity is constructed over 
time between different sub-units, as they negotiate their subject positions and the way that the 
planning process will be enacted in their local contexts.  Our study thus contributes to the 
strategy-as-practice agenda by drawing upon a framework that can capture the interaction and 
negotiation between different communities over a planning process. We show how this 
interaction and negotiation, by modifying the planning process to better accommodate 
different interests, enabled the social and political accomplishment of a common strategy 
within Brandco. From a practice perspective, we may better understand how strategic 
planning enables participation, communication and integration but also how an organization 
may neglect the socio-political dynamics through which planning and its associated activities 
are accomplished 
Our findings thus have implications for practice. The central contribution of this study 
is captured in the process model in Figure 1 and centres around that fact that for strategic 
planning to deliver integration, it needs to be conceived of as a process of co-evolution, in 
which diverse participants with different levels of planning expertise and power seek to 
modify the process to better accommodate the subject positions they wish to retain against the 
positions they are being assigned in related participation and communication activities.  
Through time this leads to shifts in the subject positions as well the planning process.  As 
such strategic integration is something that has to be co-created through negotiation rather 
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than something than can be imposed.  Managers need to be aware that people, with their 
divergent interests, goals and power bases, do strategic planning. To deliver integration a 
strategic planning process needs to take account of the divergent interests that people bring to 
that process. A common framework is more likely to be developed when socio-political 
interests, such as different levels of experience and gains or losses in power are considered in 
advance of implementing a new process. Additionally, it is important to recognize and 
incorporate into the planning process the valuable local knowledge that resides within 
different parts of the organization. While these seem to be obvious prescriptions to increase 
participation within the strategy-making process, our case shows that they may be easily 
forgotten in practice. Therefore, when implementing strategic planning as an integrative 
device, managers might develop a more differentiated, rather than standardized process, that 
accommodates different levels of participation according to the divergent interests, experience 
and power bases of key players. 
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Table 1: Timeline for Strategic Planning Process 
 
Month Planning activities/ key actors 
Jan-Mar • European Strategy Development/ EMT 
March • Sign off (by Divisional Management Team) & Issue of European Strategy to 
local market teams/ EMT 
Apr-May • Key Issue Development/ Local Market Teams 
• European Campaign Development/ EMT 
June • Key Issue review meeting/ EMT and Local Market Teams 
July • Sign off (by Divisional Management Team) & issue of Campaign to local 
market teams/ EMT 
Jul-Sept • Market Plan Development/ Local Market Teams 
• Campaign Translation & Implementation/ Local Market Teams 
Sept. • Sign off of market plans by country presidents/ Local Market Teams 
• Continued campaign Translation & Implementation/ Local Market Teams 
Sept. • Market Plan Review Meeting/ Local Market Teams  & EMT 
• Continued campaign Translation & Implementation/ Local Market Teams 
Sept  -
Nov 
• Ongoing negotiations with large markets/ EMT 
• Ongoing negotiations with EMT/ Large Local Market Teams 
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• Standardizing planning metrics 
and templates to ensure similar 
experience & local similarities
•Embedding dominant-
subordinate dynamic in 
integration activities
B1: Higher planning experience & power
•Planning perceived as subverting position 
as strategy formulator
• Integration activities experienced as 
dominating and exclusive 
A: Contextual characteristics of 
business units
• Planning experience of units
•Intra-organizational power of units
(Extent of characteristics generate 
perceptions of subject position & 




• Accommodate local 
experience within local planning 
differences
•Increase inclusion and co-
determination dynamics in 
integration activities
B2: Lower planning experience & power
• Planning perceived as strengthening 
position as strategy implementer 
•Integration activities experienced as 







D2: Develop & 
embed  inter-
dependent role 
as strategy 
implementer
Centre is 
strategy 
formulator
Resistance Acquiescence
 
